

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 119–33
OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF MASSACHUSETTS

At the end of title XVII of division A, add the following:

1 **Subtitle C—U.S.-European Nuclear**
2 **Energy Cooperation Act of 2025**

3 **SEC. 17_. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This subtitle may be cited as the “U.S.-European
5 Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2026”.

6 **SEC. 17_. STRATEGY.**

7 (a) **STRATEGY REQUIRED.**—The Secretary of State,
8 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the
9 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
10 shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro-
11 pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma-
12 lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.

13 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required by subsection
14 (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:

15 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
16 retary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by
17 United States nuclear industry entities in Europe
18 and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of
19 United States, European, and partner technologies

1 and services against Russian and Chinese tech-
2 nologies in Europe.

3 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor
4 types that are currently deployed or under regu-
5 latory review in Europe, including large light-water
6 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and
7 non-light-water reactors, and—

8 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type
9 could have in reducing Russia's influence over
10 European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040,
11 2045, and 2050;

12 (B) challenges that each reactor type may
13 face with rapid deployment, including costs,
14 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-
15 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
16 ments;

17 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on
18 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards,
19 including the minimization of weapons-usable
20 nuclear material; and

21 (D) opportunities for the use of United
22 States, European, and partner technologies and
23 services in the deployment or potential deploy-
24 ment of each reactor type.

1 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are
2 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe,
3 including use of low enriched uranium, including
4 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
5 processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
6 tions of each fuel cycle on—

7 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia’s
8 market share in Europe for uranium, conver-
9 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now
10 and 2030;

11 (B) achieving long-term energy security
12 free of Russian influence; and

13 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation
14 standards, including the minimization of weap-
15 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe-
16 ty and security standards.

17 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and
18 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov-
19 ernment is currently funding the development of,
20 and—

21 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these
22 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus-
23 sia’s market share in the United States and
24 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium
25 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel

1 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear
2 fuel reprocessing in the short, medium, and
3 long term;

4 (B) the impact of these technologies on the
5 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mate-
6 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura-
7 nium or plutonium fuels; and

8 (C) an assessment of the use cases for
9 each of these designs and fuel cycles.

10 (5) An overview of the United States Govern-
11 ment's diplomatic engagements regarding the nu-
12 clear energy sector in Europe.

13 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu-
14 clear power programs, and—

15 (A) an analysis of each country's nuclear
16 energy policy;

17 (B) an overview of existing areas of co-
18 operation with regards to nuclear energy be-
19 tween each country and—

20 (i) the United States;

21 (ii) other European and friendly coun-
22 tries; and

23 (iii) adversarial countries including
24 China and Russia;

1 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu-
2 ture cooperation between each country and the
3 United States with regards to nuclear energy;
4 and

5 (D) a summary of fuel types used in each
6 country's nuclear power programs.

7 (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influ-
8 ence in the European nuclear energy sector.

9 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov-
10 ernment is working with allies and partners to
11 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro-
12 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter
13 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver-
14 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as
15 well as in reactor construction.

16 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov-
17 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col-
18 laboration with allies and partners on countering
19 Russia's influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with
20 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be-
21 tween United States companies and companies in
22 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

23 (10) An assessment of Rosatom's role in Rus-
24 sia's energy sector, to include an overview of
25 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.

1 (c) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the
2 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
3 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
4 the strategy required by subsection (a).

5 (d) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (a)
6 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain
7 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa-
8 rately from the unclassified strategy.

9 **SEC. 17__ . AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

10 There is authorized to be appropriated \$30,000,000
11 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2031 to support
12 critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with
13 the strategy required by section 17__(a) on countering
14 Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on
15 responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early
16 stage nuclear power project support, and countering Rus-
17 sian disinformation campaigns.

18 **SEC. 17__ . DEFINITIONS.**

19 In this subtitle:

20 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
21 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
22 mittees” means—

23 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
24 the House of Representatives;

1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate;

3 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com-
4 merce of the House of the Representatives; and

5 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural
6 Resources of the Senate.

7 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—

8 The term “high assay low enriched uranium” means
9 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the
10 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5
11 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.

12 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term “low
13 enriched uranium” means fuel in which the weight
14 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 per-
15 cent.

